

00.5260  
Taylor Questions: North Vietnam  
Logistics Activities  
April 1968

NSC Review Completed.

21 Feb 68 I/L Blind Memo re Techniques and Problems Relative to Monitoring Enemy Traffic into and Through Laos

25X1 26 Feb 68 [ ] informal note re number of people working on enemy logistics; comments on [ ] cables re lack of adequate air support for allied operations throughout Laos

No Date Handwritten Tables re Estimate Full Time Transport Workers, 559 Transportation Group, Laos (strength); Organized Battalion Transport, South Vietnam (strength)

No Date Map: Cambodia and South Vietnam Area (showing Base Areas)

11 Mar 68 Patrick Coyne to John Bross memo re North Vietnam Logistic Activities forwarding list of questions from Maxwell Taylor added after Taylor briefing of 26 Feb 68

23 Mar 68 Maxwell Taylor to Pat Coyne informal note requesting briefing on enemy OB in South Vietnam

25X1 24 Apr 68 [ ] to AD/DCI/NIPE memo re Questions Raised by General Maxwell Taylor (response to questions attached) -- Project 00.5260

26 Apr 68 TOP SECRET Blind Memo re Intelligence on the Enemy Logistics System, What is the logistics system?

Attachment: TOP SECRET Parrott Memo for Record, dated 29 Apr 68, re Discussion with General Maxwell Taylor on North Vietnamese Logistics

2 May 68 TOP SECRET John Bross to Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll letter General Maxwell's Taylor's request that more attention be given to logistics intelligence

15 May 68 Lt. Gen. Carroll to Patrick Coyne letter forwarding piece on Training of North Vietnamese Armed Forces Personnel

No Date Distribution list for Project 00.5260

PFIAB/NSC Review Completed.

DIA review completed.



**SECRET**  
**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Executive Registry  
68-191813

DDI-1504-68

S-3079/AP-4A

15 MAY 1968

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne  
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20501

Dear Mr. Coyne:

(C) Reference is made to your memorandum of 30 April, Training of North Vietnam Armed Forces Personnel, in which you requested the Central Intelligence Agency to obtain additional data on the joint CIA/DIA paper entitled "The Attrition of Vietnamese Communist Forces, 1968-1969" on behalf of General Taylor.

(C) On 2 May, Mr. Thomas A. Parrott of the Central Intelligence Agency requested DIA to respond to your memorandum. The information at enclosure 1 is keyed to the specific questions posed by General Taylor. Geographic references are shown on map at enclosure 2.

Sincerely,

**SECRET**  
JOSEPH F. CARROLL  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

- 2 Enclosures  
1. Training of NVN Armed Forces Personnel (C), 1 cy (S)  
2. Map of NVN, 1 cy (U)

cc: Mr. Thomas A. Parrott, CIA

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR  
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY  
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

**SECRET**

Conf  
Not to be released from CIA

25X1

Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5

**de Denial**

Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5

SECRET

Training of North Vietnamese Armed Forces Personnel (C)

1. (S) Summary. Since 1964, NVA induction standards have been lowered and terms of service extended because of the increased commitment in South Vietnam. This commitment has also resulted in an expanded training establishment and lower training standards. A shortage of competent leadership has developed from the squad leader to the company-grade level. Strengths and weaknesses of VC and NVA units derive primarily from the quality of their leadership, the area in which they operate, and the tactics they are forced to employ. Over-all, VC and NVA troops are regarded by Free World forces as determined and tenacious adversaries.

2. (S) Q: How and where is the NVN recruit enlisted or inducted into the Armed Forces? How long does he serve? How many candidates are rejected for military service?

A: NVA recruiting and induction standards appear to be the responsibility of the military region, with the province and its subordinate districts tasked to meet quotas set by the military region headquarters, the NVA High Command, and the National Defense Council. Administrative committees have been established in all cities, villages, districts and provinces to oversee the implementation of conscription policies. They register all available male personnel from 17 to 45; for example, upon reaching 17, the male is given a written order to report to his district headquarters for a physical examination, tests, and to fill out a biographic questionnaire. He is then assigned a draft category. When new recruits are called up, they are sent to a provincial induction center for final processing and assignment to training units.

The recruitment system has changed since 1964. In that year, callups were instituted on a quarterly rather than a semiannual basis; some areas have been calling up men on a monthly basis since then.

The length of enlistment has been changed from three years to an indefinite period. Of the estimated 120,000 personnel who come of draft age each year, an estimated 100,000 are drafted. The remaining 20,000 are rejected or exempted from service. Lower induction standards due to increased manpower demands are evident in prisoner-of-war statements. One stated he had not been allowed to fire his squad's machine gun because he was blind in one eye. Another reported that he knew of an NVA soldier who had suffered a heart attack but was not released from active duty. A third related that he was inducted in 1967 after having been rejected for health reasons in 1964 and 1965. Other prisoner-of-war statements indicate that persons previously deferred or exempt from the draft are being called to active duty.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR  
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY  
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

3. (S) Q: How and where does he receive basic training? How long? Of what does it consist? What evidence of reduction in duration or quality in recent months?

A: The NVA training program has apparently been changed several times since 1964, primarily because of the expansion of the army and increased troop commitments in South Vietnam. In 1964, basic infantry training -- from four to six months for the infantry soldier -- was conducted by division training battalions. In 1965-1966, however, the basic infantry training cycle was apparently reduced to three to four months and was conducted by both training battalions subordinate to divisions and independent training battalions and regiments subordinate to the military region. Moreover, infiltration training was largely shifted to the 338th Infantry Brigade. (In late 1966/early 1967, the NVA established at least three basic infantry training centers at Hoa Binh, Tho Xuan, and Phu Binh.)

A review of prisoner-of-war reports indicates that some personnel drafted into the NVA during the late 1966 to mid-1967 period infiltrated into South Vietnam after receiving six weeks or less basic training in training units or centers. Prisoners-of-war trained by regular NVA units during 1966-1967, however, reported that they received six to eight months of basic and advanced infantry training prior to their infiltration training.

Known basic training units are: the 320B or 320th Garrison Infantry Division at Hoa Binh; the 250th Training Group at Ha Bac; the 338th Infantry Brigade in Thanh Hoa Province, and the 42d Infantry Regiment of the 350th Division in Haiphong. A number of prisoner-of-war reports indicate that basic, advanced, and infiltration training is also conducted in regular army units throughout North Vietnam. It is believed that infiltration training, once given separately, is now integrated into the regular basic training cycle.

Analysis of prisoner-of-war reports indicate that most training units have vacated their permanent facilities in favor of areas offering cover, concealment, and a realistic environment for combat instruction. The reports also indicate that troops are usually quartered in houses in adjacent villages and that training normally takes place six days a week. The recruit's day begins with physical exercise followed by political indoctrination and such military training as grenade and bayonet practice, hand-to-hand combat, map reading, individual-weapons training and marksmanship, and infiltration techniques. Infiltration training includes the use of camouflage and forced marches, with heavy packs.

SECRET

4. (S) Q: What analogous information is available regarding the training of officers and NCOs?

A: The more formal NCO and OCS schools, as well as the military academy at Son Tay, have been abandoned following severe US airstrikes. Officer training is now conducted in division OCS classes of two-three months' duration; classes are composed of senior NCOs who have been recalled or those who have completed at least seven years of formal schooling. NCO training is no longer mandatory, but some divisions offer short courses. Soldiers who have good records and exhibit political zeal are eligible to hold NCO rank.

The NVA apparently has a shortage of properly trained personnel to fill platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leader positions. The over-all competence of the company-grade officer has declined during the past two years because of demands of the expanding air defense effort, the upgrading of several brigades to divisions, and the necessity to create additional divisions, regiments, and supporting elements for infiltration into South Vietnam. This qualitative decline will probably continue despite attempts to accelerate the officer and NCO training program.

5. (S) Q: What do our troops think of the comparative combat capabilities of VC and NVN units? What are their strengths and weaknesses?

A: VC and NVA units that are well trained and led fight extremely well and are respected by our troops. In I and II CTZ, NVA units are better equipped, trained and led than enemy elements farther south and are more highly regarded. Contact with a VC unit will frequently result in a point-to-point engagement; whereas an NVA unit will usually deploy on line and attempt to assault through the position. Also the NVA will pursue, whereas the VC will break contact. It is important to note, however, that our troops generally find VC forces somewhat more difficult to cope with since their unconventional tactics seem to concern the individual Marine or soldier to a greater extent.

On occasion, particularly when they occupy well-prepared defensive positions, VC troops fight with considerable skill even though they have less staying power than their NVA counterparts. In III CTZ, VC units, especially those with large percentages of filler personnel from the local forces, will offer a more determined and effective resistance than the NVA since they are very familiar with the areas in which they are fighting. The units which are all NVA will probably perform the poorest if their officers are lost in battle. They also have to depend on the VC for supplies and guides, and once out of touch can become lost and demoralized.

SECRET

SECRET


In general, VC units are better able to fight a guerrilla war and in battalion-size actions of a limited nature where surprise is essential but massive fire support is not. NVA forces are better equipped to fight more conventional battles, where they can use their fire support to good advantage, use prepared positions, and employ large numbers of troops in a concentrated area.

Major VC weaknesses derive from hurried local recruitment, the adverse psychological impact on the people of the upsurge in terrorism since the Tet offensive, their dependence on food, supplies, and money from the South Vietnamese people, their general lack of antiaircraft weapons, and their need to rely on detailed planning that reduces flexibility. NVA units are strong during initial contacts, i.e., before their new replacements have faced the realities of the military and political situation in South Vietnam, and before they have been exposed to our overwhelming fire support. The political officers' propaganda lectures are difficult to reconcile with the realities of the situation in South Vietnam.

Inflexibility of reaction on several occasions suggests shortcomings in Communist training and leadership as well. Many experienced VC cadre were lost during Tet, losses which may be qualitatively irreplaceable in the near future. To a certain extent, this was also true of NVA units. Hanoi can infiltrate cadre from the North, but the apparent lack of training and poor motivation of lower-ranking soldiers cause us to suspect that most of the NVA units lack effective low-level leadership.

Our troops have considerable respect for the enemy's capability for intense short term mortar/rocket fire and, at the small unit level, intense automatic-weapons fire. Tactical movement is skillful, and units are very good at concealment and utilizing strong defensive positions. The enemy's effective use of surprise and his ability to fight at night are worthy of note as well.

SECRET





SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/I		u
2	DD/OER		
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b>  <p>For your information and file. You have a copy of Mr. Parrott's letter to Gen. Brown, dated 2 May (ER 68-1918/2).</p> <p>1-2 : For your information. Kw</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
O/DCI/NIPE 7E 22			21 May
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

DDI-1334-68

2 May 1968

Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Joe:

As you no doubt know, [ ] DIA, along with [ ] and Tom Parrott, had a discussion with General Maxwell Taylor last Friday with the object of trying to settle once and for all exactly what it is that General Taylor wants us to do in the field of logistics intelligence.

As [ ] will have undoubtedly passed along, General Taylor reiterated his conviction that logistics intelligence has not been given as much attention as have various other fields and that he feels strongly that something has to be done to improve this. He stated that he believes this is 93% a military problem and thus one of primary concern to DIA.

He had prepared a one-page paper which outlines succinctly the intelligence problems that must be addressed on a continuing basis and which also clarifies exactly what he hopes to get from improved intelligence in this field. A copy of this paper is attached.

With respect to the specific steps that he expects the community to take, General Taylor said that he wants CINCPAC to be told that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board feels that logistics intelligence is not receiving enough attention and that more effort must be put on it, particularly along the lines of his brief memorandum. Specifically, he wants to make sure that these topics are included in interrogation guides at all levels. I assume that this is something you will want to handle. I would think that it would fit very well into the responsibilities of CINCPAC's new Intelligence Coordination Group.

**TOP SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

TS #187053/2

**TOP SECRET**

Incidentally, General Taylor also informed Tom that he was going to speak to the Secretary of Defense about giving [ ] what it needs in the way of [ ] configured aircraft. He says that he believes it is in the national interest to do so.

25X1  
25X1

Sincerely,

TSigned

John A. Bross

Attachment  
TS No. 189053

NIPE:TAP:dm

Distribution:

- #1 and #2 w/cy #10 & 11 of att. - Addressee
- #3 w/o att. - ER
- #4 w/o att. - NIPE/PFIAB
- #5 w/o att. - NIPE/chrono
- #6 w/o att. - NIPE/TAP chrono
- (#7) w/o att. - DD/I

MAY 3 8 37 AM

**TOP SECRET**

XERO  
COPY

XERO  
COPY

XERO  
COPY

XERO  
COPY

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/OER 4F19	3 May 68	
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	XXX INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDR		DATE	
C/DDI Exec Staff		3 May	
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	

Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5

Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78102095R0006000260001-5

UNCLASSIFIED when blank — TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document — Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
SOURCE		CIA CONTROL NO.	
NIPE		TS 189053/2	
DOC. NO. TS 189053/2		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED	
DOC. DATE 27 May 68		27 May 1968	
COPY NO. 2 Super B		LOGGED BY	
NUMBER OF PAGES			
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS			

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

[illegible]

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
BY (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

TOP SECRET

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	D/OER 4F 18	5/1	
2	DD/OER	3 May	
3			
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
AD/DCI/NIPE 7E 22			1 May
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	





~~TOP SECRET~~

29 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with General Maxwell Taylor  
on North Vietnamese Logistics


1. [ ] OCL, [ ] DIA and I met by prearrangement with General Taylor on Friday, the 26th of April, to discuss the North Vietnamese logistic situation. Our purpose was first to have General Taylor meet the two individuals who have been designated as being responsible for following materiel and personnel infiltration, by [ ] DIA respectively; and to discuss with General Taylor exactly what it is that he wants to get from the intelligence community which he quite clearly has not been getting.

2. The discussion was frank and friendly. No one else was present. As a result of my telephone discussion with General Taylor the previous week, in the course of setting this meeting up, he had prepared a written sheet (copy attached) which outlines succinctly what it is that he is searching for in the intelligence field.

3. In the course of the discussion General Taylor reiterated some of the points that he has made a number of times before. Among these were the statement that he finds it disturbing that there is no point of "undivided responsibility" for logistics in the community and that in his opinion not enough effort has been expended in getting logistics intelligence, as contrasted to the effort in other fields. He felt that the logistics problem is 98% a military one and that DIA should thus be the agent for all of this kind of intelligence. He again reverted to a familiar theme to the effect that [ ] seems to be duplicating what should properly be a DIA function, and that the Agency appears to be going beyond what it is "authorized by law" to do.

4. This led to a detailed discussion of why this situation exists. We pointed out that unless [ ] gets deeply enough into matters of this kind, it is not going to be in a position to make a very useful contribution to the assessment of intelligence. We cited, for example, the "numbers game" in which the Agency has been able to exert

~~TOP SECRET~~



TS 189053/1  
Copy #5

**TOP SECRET**

considerable weight in arriving at reasonable figures--which would not be possible if [ ] officers were not thoroughly familiar with the situation. We spoke also of the matter of continuity of personnel, the lack of which makes it difficult for DIA to produce really useful intelligence in such fields as strategic research; the special situation which obtains with respect to Free World versus Bloc economic intelligence; etc. None of this had much effect on General Taylor and he returned to the proposition that it would be enough for [ ] to "spot check" what DIA was doing and that this would be in line with what [ ] as an agency should do. We then left this subject about where it started (and about where many people have come out in previous similar discussions with General Taylor).

5. After examining General Taylor's attached list and discussing it in some detail, I said that this seemed to indicate that he did not expect us to produce a "model" of the logistic system. He said he was not interested in a model--that this is a term used by the scientists and not one that would appeal to him. He acknowledged that perhaps he had been so close to the scientists that he had said something of this sort, but he really was not expecting us to produce a model. With respect to exactly what he did want us to do, he felt that the most important thing was for DIA to notify CINCPAC and MACV that the President's Board feels strongly that logistics are not receiving enough attention and that special efforts must be devoted to catching up in this area. He wanted his list of questions to be passed along to CINCPAC and to have the principal responsibility centered there for assuring that these questions are on all interrogation lists. He thought that almost any prisoner or defector would have knowledge of some part of the logistic system even if it were only connected with his own personal training, and that it should be standard procedure to cover questions of this kind in all interrogations.

6. General Taylor said that he had read with interest the answers to the nine questions which he had submitted to [ ] which had just been received that morning. He said these take care of many of his worries and that he really had no further questions now. He thought that if we continued to examine the list of intelligence desired, which is shown on the sheet he gave us, this would accomplish a good deal of what he is trying to do.

7. He also said that he would have to talk to the Secretary of Defense about giving NSA what it needs [ ] as he believes it is in the national interest to do so. He expressed some exasperation that "someone half way around

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

the world," like himself, had to take on this chore. He solicited no response and I made none.

8. I will draft a letter to General Carroll giving the gist of this interview and passing along General Taylor's written statement and his desires for action as expressed in paragraph 5 above.

(Signed) Thomas A. Parrott

Thomas A. Parrott  
AD/DCI/NIPE

cc: DCI  
DDCI  
DD/I  
DD/P  
D/OER  
D/OCI

**TOP SECRET**

**Page Denied**

24 April 68

AD/DCI/NIPE  
THRU : Chief, Executive Staff, O/DD/I

DD/OER

Questions Raised by General Maxwell Taylor

Attached are the responses to the nine questions  
raised by General Maxwell Taylor.

25X1

Attachment:  
As stated above

Distribution: (Project 00.51 60)  
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/3 cys att.  
1 - Ch/Exec. Staff, O/DD/I w/1 cy att.  
✓ 1 - DD/OER w/att.

DD/OER:PVW:ajs

Copy 1 of 4

25X1

25X1



Question 1.


What assurance is available that CIA and DIA are pressing intelligence collectors sufficiently to obtain necessary information on the Viet Cong/North Vietnam logistic system? Is it not feasible for CIA and DIA to sit down with MACV and work out the intelligence collection program required to meet this intelligence need, or is this already being done?

1. CIA has maintained an active intelligence collection program designed to obtain necessary information on the enemy logistic system. In addition, there are frequent exchanges and contacts between the collectors and the requesters of the information. These contacts are carried out at all levels and among all relevant parties. Thus, for example, there are contacts among the DD/I representative, the Chief of Station and J-2, MACV in Saigon; among logistic analysts in DD/I, DIA, and ACSI; between the analysis group in the Saigon Station and CIVC (Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam); between CAS and Military intelligence personnel in the field; and between responsible levels in CIA and NSA. CIA, DIA, and MACV have met in conference to discuss the collection, processing and analysis of intelligence on enemy logistics, the last such meeting having taken place in May 1967. A conference scheduled for February 1968 was cancelled because of the TET offensive.

2. Despite these programs, important gaps in intelligence remain. Some are unavoidable. Gaps may result from enemy security precautions; the questionable reliability of some clandestine informants; the limited number of POW's/ralliers with detailed knowledge of the enemy logistic system; a lack of planes to devote to more extensive reconnaissance directed against enemy logistics or to serve as communications platforms directed primarily against logistics intelligence; and even, in some cases, from the multi-layered, multi-agency collection effort itself, where "the word" on intelligence needs may be lost, misconstrued or yield to other priorities on its way through channels.

3. CIA has produced many requirements -- specific and general -- directed to the acquisition of intelligence on the VC/NVA logistic system. These requirements, which are assigned a high priority, are levied on various intelligence collectors. The primary sources of information on enemy logistics

25X1



25X1

A comprehensive listing of CIA requirements with respect to enemy logistics in Southeast Asia is found in the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL). The CIRL -- an updating of which has just

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

been published -- is distributed throughout the intelligence community and supplements specific requirements levied against one particular phase or source of logistics information. The IPC List on North Vietnam, published by [ ] for the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee, has a section devoted to questions on logistical support. At the highest level, the Priority National Intelligence Objectives include a requirement for evidence of Communist use of Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating base, or source of supply. A description of [ ] requirements on enemy logistics is attached to this response.

25X1

25X1

4. [ ] believes that some gaps in intelligence on enemy logistics could be reduced by more intensive collection efforts. We agree that it certainly would be feasible for a future meeting of [ ] DIA, and MACV to place greater emphasis on an improved intelligence collection program vis-a-vis processing and analysis. The February conference on logistics would have been precisely such a step. We presume that this conference will be rescheduled as soon as MACV finds it possible to do so. In the meantime, we are able and do keep in touch with MACV on collection problems through our established requirements programs, through communications handled by Agency representatives in Saigon and through TDY visits of [ ] to MACV J-2 and CICV.

25X1

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

- 2 -

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied



Question 2.

What are the estimated figures on the interdicted capacity of the various transport systems over which supplies are introduced into North Vietnam and over which they subsequently move south (in contrast to the theoretical un-interdicted capacities)? Also what are the figures on the amounts and kinds of supplies which actually pass over the roads over which distribution is made by North Vietnam to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces (in contrast to the theoretical capacity of the road net).

A. Interdicted Capacity

The capacity of a transport system is a theoretical concept that is dependent on a wide variety of factors, including the extent and condition of facilities, and the availability of equipment, labor, and managerial skills. It is a highly useful concept in analyzing logistical systems and permits our analysts to judge how one transport system compares to another, and how intensely a road or railroad is being used. It indicates how much a road or railroad can be expected to move, on the average, over an extended period of time. However, the methodology behind estimates of "capacity" is not sensitive to short-term changes or variations. While the original theoretical capacity of a railroad may be reduced temporarily by bombing, simple expedients and countermeasures may prevent any extended decline in the overall capacity of the system. Interdicted capacity becomes critical only when the actual traffic on a road or railroad approaches its theoretical capacity and the possibility of further countermeasures has been exhausted. These conditions have seldom been met in North Vietnam. For these reasons we believe that estimates of interdicted capacity would be tenuous at best, would need constant revision, and would be potentially misleading.

The North Vietnamese ability to counteract interdictions is illustrated by the numerous alternates around the Hanoi Railroad/Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the Red River. This mile-long bridge provided the only direct rail and highway access into Hanoi from Haiphong, Dong Dang, and other northern areas, but 800 feet of the Bridge was destroyed by air strikes in December 1967. However, there are now 6 highway pontoon bridges, 7 highway vehicle ferries, and 3 pairs of railroad car ferry slips with a combined capacity estimated at 19,000 short tons each way per day. This alternate capacity exceeds the 16,600 ton combined capacity of the rail lines and highways that formerly had been dependent on the Doumer Bridge.

Another example of "interdicted" transport capacity in North Vietnam occurred in the summer of 1966 when the railroad/highway

SECRET

25X1

bridge at Viet Tri between Hanoi and Lao Cai on the Chinese border was destroyed. Before the destruction of the Viet Tri bridge, this line had a capacity of 3,300 tons each way per day. Immediately after the interdiction the through capacity of the railroad was zero because it was impossible to run a train from Hanoi to Lao Cai. A railroad car ferry was later installed that permitted about 800 tons of traffic to move across the river each way per day and we have since carried the capacity of this line at this figure. However, the reduction in capacity from 3,300 tons to an "interdicted" capacity of 800 tons has no significance, because one ferry can carry the total small volume of traffic that moves on this railroad. If another ferry were added the capacity of the railroad would increase to 1,600 tons each way per day, and if 4 ferries were put in operation -- a feat well within North Vietnamese capabilities -- the capacity of the line would be restored to its preinterdiction level.

B. Supply Movements Over Roads

There is insufficient intelligence to estimate reliably the actual traffic flow within the transport system -- that is, the number of trains, trucks, or watercraft moving along specific routes over a given time period. Nor can we estimate on the basis of hard intelligence the composition of the goods moving over the transport system. However, we can make estimates based on firm intelligence of the total volume (but not the composition) of goods moving from North Vietnam into Laos. These estimates were made available in our recent briefings.

Our estimates of supply flows are heavily dependent on our knowledge of the tonnages and types of supplies that enter the country (on which there is good intelligence), requirements for these supplies in various parts of the country, and the impressions of traffic movements gleaned from photography, pilot reporting, and

25X1

While the precise flow on the individual LOC's can not be quantified we are confident that only a small percent of the theoretical capacity of any major LOC is actually being used.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET** [ ]

25X1

Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5

Question 3.

Is it not possible at this time to obtain better figures on the size and mission of the various enemy Transportation Groups spotted on the chart used in the briefing by a [ ] representative?


25X1

25X1



B. The Thanh Hoa Rear Services Headquarters, located in the vicinity of Thanh Hoa, is believed to be at the major distribution point for materiel destined for tactical areas in Laos, South Vietnam, and the DMZ. Thanh Hoa is strategically situated at the confluence of major rail, water, and land routes leading into the southern Panhandle of North Vietnam.

25X1



II. Mission of Transportation Groups in Laos

The 559th Transportation Group, with headquarters located near the entrance of Routes 137/912 into the Laotian Panhandle, controls the Laos/Cambodian logistical corridor. It is directly subordinate to the Directorate of Rear Services. Vehicle count in the 559th Group is unknown. The strength of the entire 559th Group, with subordinate elements, is estimated at 5,000 men; the strength of specific subordinate units is unknown. Subordinate elements and their responsibilities are listed below:

**TOP SECRET** [ ]

25X1

Approved For Release 2009/05/08 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600260001-5

A. The 559th Transportation Group Forward Headquarters controls logistical movements along Laotian Routes 911/914 and 92/922 leading into I Corps.

B. The 70th Transportation Regiment is responsible for all types of logistical movements, including the operation of the first 17 way stations in the personnel infiltration system in the Laotian Panhandle leading southward from North Vietnam.

C. The 71st Transportation Regiment is believed to be located in the general vicinity of Ban Bac. In addition to controlling truck and boat operations, the 71st Regiment is responsible for the operation of 12 personnel infiltration way stations in the southern Laotian Panhandle south of the 17 way stations controlled by the 70th Transportation Regiment. The dividing line between the 70th and 71st Regiments appears to begin at a point in Laos opposite the Quang Nam/Thua Thien border area and extends to Attopeu.

D. The 98th NVA Regiment is responsible for the movement of supplies up the Se Kong River from Stung Treng, Cambodia, and along Route 110 in Laos to the Tri Border Area. The Headquarters of this unit was extremely active during the recent fighting in Dak To, South Vietnam, indicating it may have responsibility for supplying NVA units operating in that part of South Vietnam.

E. The A Shau Rear Services Headquarters has the responsibility for coordinating the movement of men and supplies along Route 922 in South Vietnam, supplying infiltrators transiting the border area, and providing a rear service depot for NVA units operating in I Corps. Route security as well as road maintenance and the movement of supplies are among the functions of this unit.

F. Station 70 is the final preparation point for elements enroute to South Vietnam through the DMZ.

### III. Mission of Transportation Groups in South Vietnam

#### I Corps

Conscripted labor and transportation units organic to combat units move the supplies over trails or along streams to the receiving unit's base area. In addition, there are four known transportation battalions operating in the I Corps - the Bac Son, the Binh Son, the 500th, and the Tay Son. The Bac Son Battalion is believed to be operational in Quang Tri Province and the northern part of Thua Thien. The Binh Son Battalion is in the eastern half of Thua Thien and Quang Nam provinces. The 500th Battalion is unlocated, but believed to be responsible for Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and part

**TOP SECRET**

of Kontum Province. The Tay Son Battalion has been reported operating in the eastern half of Kontum Province and parts of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces.

### II Corps

In the highlands, the B-3 Front has established a logistical support system in which combat units are required to transport a portion of their own supplies from secure storage areas located in Cambodia. In addition, the Frong has two identified transportation battalions - the 19th Battalion located in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces, and the Nam Son Battalion located in the western portion of Kontum Province along the Cambodian border. In the coastal area, locally recruited personnel obtain foodstuffs and medical supplies for NVA combat units by local purchase or taxation.

### III Corps

The VC/NVA logistical effort in III Corps is supported by the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) Rear Service Groups. Six of these groups (Numbers 81-86) operate in the eleven provinces in III Corps, supplying the VC/NVA units operating in its area:

<u>Group Number</u>	<u>Area of Responsibility</u>
81	War Zone D in northern Long Khanh Province.
82	Northern Tay Ninh Province.
83	Binh Long, Binh Duong, and Gia Dinh Province.
84	Region E (Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, and Phuoc Tuy Provinces).
85	Unknown.
86	Phuoc Long Province.

### IV Corps

In IV Corps, in country military region depots and base supply areas have been established for logistical support, and supplies are transported from these depots and base areas to regimental and battalion supply points. Three battalions have been identified providing support to Communist forces: The 518th Coastal Security (infantry) in the coastal area of Kien Hoa Province, The 101st Transportation Battalion in Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Ba Xuyen, and An Xuyen Provinces, and The TN3175 Battalion in An Xuyen Province. These battalions avoid enemy contact, but they are reported to be active on the eastern shore of the Ca Mau Peninsula.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**IV. Size of Communist Transportation Groups in Laos and South Vietnam

Personnel strength of Communist Transportation Groups in Laos and South Vietnam are estimated below. The estimates are consistent with MACV Order of Battle except where noted. The estimates do not include conscripted laborers who perform transportation duties on a part time or full time basis for up to 90 days a year, personnel in transportation units for which there has only been fragmentary reports, and many other personnel engaged in transportation functions who are not assigned to formally designated transportation units.

Communist Transportation Elements in Laos

<u>Units</u>	<u>Strength</u>
<u>559th Transportation Group</u>	5,000 (MACV estimate 4,000)
559th Transportation Group Forward	
Headquarters	
70th Transportation Regiment	
71st Transportation Regiment	
98th Regiment	
A Shau Valley Rear Services (not confirmed by MACV)	
Station 70 (not confirmed by MACV)	

Communist Transportation Elements in South Vietnam

<u>Units</u>	<u>Strength</u>
<u>I Corps</u>	
Binh Son Tran Bn.	400
Bac Son Tran Bn.	400 (no estimate made by MACV)
500th Tran Bn.	400 (no estimate made by MACV)
Tay Son Tran Bn.	400
Total	<u>1,600</u>
<u>II Corps</u>	
19th Tran Bn.	300
Nam Son Tran Bn.	400
Total	<u>700</u>

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Communist Transportation Elements in South Vietnam  
(continued)

<u>Units</u>	<u>Strength</u>
<u>III Corps</u>	
Rear Service Group 81	500
Rear Service Group 82	1,500
Rear Service Group 83	1,000
Rear Service Group 84	1,000
Rear Service Group 85	150
Rear Service Group 86	1,000
48th Tran Bn.	300
Total	<u>5,450</u>
<u>IV Corps</u>	
518th Coastal Security Bn.	400 (no estimate made by MACV)
A 101 Transportation Bn.	250 (no estimate made by MACV)
TN 3175 Transportation Bn.	450 (no estimate made by MACV)
Total	<u>1,100</u>
Total - South Vietnam	<u><u>8,850</u></u>

**TOP SECRET**

Question 4.

Has not someone studied available intelligence on the movement of North Vietnamese forces, as the basis for an understanding of what takes place when a division moves south?

Question 9.

What do we know about the enemy's replacement system? How, when and for how long are replaced trained? How moved South? How incorporated into units?

The answers to these questions are contained in the following statement on the infiltration process.

1. [ ] 1 January 1968 has indicated that more than 60,000 regular and replacement personnel of the North Vietnamese armed forces have been deployed toward South Vietnam. It is not known how many have actually entered friendly territory, but this movement represents a dramatic increase in the level of infiltration as it has existed since the US troop build-up and bombing campaign began in 1965.

2. Over the years, Hanoi probably has committed more than a quarter of a million men to the conflict in the South. To accomplish troop deployments of this magnitude in a clandestine manner -- and in spite of allied military action both North and South -- has required the development of extraordinarily effective procedures for personnel infiltration.


25X1







#### The Infiltration Network

8. Infiltration groups originate from different parts of North Vietnam and take a variety of routes to different points in the south. Most infiltrators, however, are drawn from established units or training centers in the Red River valley area and are transported by truck or by train at least as far as the Thanh Hoa region at the head of the North Vietnamese panhandle.

9. From this point south the great majority of the infiltrating personnel have proceeded on foot. 

 prisoner interrogations have suggested that a substantial percentage of first quarter infiltration in 1968 has been accomplished by truck. If true, this may only be a temporary measure adopted by Hanoi to radically alter the balance of forces in its favor as part of a new "fight-talk" strategy. Over the years, infiltration by vehicle has been confined to high ranking cadre or individuals with special skills -- such as medical or weapons technicians. Prisoners have indicated that infiltration by truck can be accomplished in two to three weeks; by foot at least eight weeks are required.

10. From Thanh Hoa south, all infiltration groups are supported and controlled by a highly effective organization of administrative, logistic, communications and transport personnel. This system



extends over a complex network of trails which as far south as the delta region below Saigon and through lengthy portions of eastern Laos and Cambodia. Way stations are scattered along all the infiltration trails at intervals of no more than a day's march. In much of North Vietnam these stations are established in or around villages or hamlets, but as the infiltration routes approach the North Vietnamese border and pass into friendly territory, sites are selected in remote jungle areas.

11. Way stations have two major functions: to provide rest and replenishment areas for infiltrating personnel and a base for the individuals who control and support the infiltrators. The stations vary in their facilities from mere stopping points in the jungle to major depots equipped to provide food, shelter and medical care.

12. Compartmentation is a security measure applied to all phases of the infiltration process. The way station control bases are usually located about a kilometer away from the bivouac areas used by the infiltrating troops. Prisoners have reported that only the commanding officer, communications personnel, and occasional supply carriers from the infiltrating groups are permitted to go to the base area. The same principal is applied in keeping base personnel at adjacent way stations from knowing the locations of each other's sites. Those who are assigned to guide infiltration groups customarily meet their opposite numbers from the next station at some intermediate point along the trail and pass over control of the groups at that time.

13. Interrogation of captured personnel has revealed the efficiency of the infiltration network. Boats ranging from small sampans to larger ferries are provided at every waterway which the infiltrators cannot ford. Prisoners have reported little delay or confusion at these potential bottlenecks and have remarked on the competence of the network personnel. We have no firm information on how many men are involved in running the infiltration routes, but it is apparent that the North Vietnamese have given the system a high priority in personnel and logistic planning.

#### Infiltration Group

14. Infiltration groups have ranged in size from about 20 to 2,000 men, depending upon Hanoi's needs in the South. The smaller groups probably are composed of personnel whose unique training or responsibilities justify the formation of a special infiltration unit. The larger ones appear to be made up of regular army formations or groups of unassigned replacement personnel. Apparently there is no standard size for an infiltration group, but prisoners have reported that normally they marched in

units of about 100 men. This figure probably represents a practical number in moving personnel on the infiltration trails and suggests that large groups are subdivided into marching elements of about this size. In the case of a regular North Vietnamese battalion -- about 500 men -- the component companies appear to move separately at intervals of a few kilometers between each unit. Infiltrating battalions are normally separated by at least a day's march.

15. When the infiltrators begin their march in North Vietnam they move only at night. In the daytime they rest in the homes of villagers who are out working. The marchers normally set out at about 6:00 p.m. and then, depending upon terrain, continue for six to nine hours. While moving south in their own territory, the infiltrators seem to use normal lines of communication such as main roads or levees along river banks. As they turn West toward Laos, however, they abandon these established routes for special infiltration trails and shift from a night to a day march schedule. This is probably because US air interdiction efforts are less intense in Laos and because of the concealment afforded by heavy jungle growth in this region. The group normally sets out about 6:00 a.m. and will march for about six to nine hours, depending on terrain.

16. In foreign territory infiltration groups are careful to keep away from main lines of communication. Every effort is made to conceal the presence of the unit, including the use of temporary planking when crossing dirt roads in order not to leave footprints. As the infiltrators move through Laotian territory, opposite South Vietnam, they are occasionally subjected to mining and ambushes initiated by guerrilla forces. Several sources have recounted being bombed by US strategic and tactical aircraft, but there is little evidence that major losses have come from air attacks.

17. The infiltrators are not accompanied or supported by supply vehicles on the trip south. Although bicycles may be employed to carry some items of heavy equipment, such as communications gear, they are seldom reported. Each man carries his own food, medicine, field equipment and weapons and is periodically resupplied from depots along the route of march. Basically, the infiltration groups have been kept apart from the supplies which they will eventually use in South Vietnam. Prisoners have reported hearing supply trucks on parallel routes, but for the most part, the infiltrators move on trails which are a safe distance from the often bombed supply roads.

18. The infiltrator moving toward South Vietnam faces a number of difficulties other than air raids and guerrilla action, including hunger, harsh terrain and disease. Malaria is the most

frequent problem encountered by the infiltration groups. Most reports from captured troops indicate that about 75 percent of the infiltrators contract this disease in varying intensity at some point during the march south. Each man is supplied with anti-malaria medication, however, and most are able to complete the trip. Dysentary, beri-beri, and respiratory diseases also are reported to plague the infiltrators.

19. There appears to be a clear correlation between the incidence of disease and the weather. If the soldiers are scheduled to infiltrate during the rainy season, the difficulties of the march are markedly increased. As a result, morale declines and the number who become sick or desert grows. The proportion of personnel lost to these causes varies widely in captured documents and prisoner reporting from five to fifty percent. It is likely, however, that very few casualties along the trails are permanent and that after a period of recuperation or re-indoctrination the detained individuals join another group and continue south.

#### Disposition of Infiltrators

20. When infiltration groups arrive in South Vietnam, their assignments depend upon whether they are intended as regular or replacement personnel. If they are regular North Vietnamese Army units, the company-size groups will normally rejoin their battalions and regiments and operate as an integrated unit. If they are replacement personnel who never were part of any organic North Vietnamese command, they will probably be assigned on an individual, company or battalion basis to existing North Vietnamese regiments to fill vacancies.

21. There is, in addition, a third disposition of infiltration groups which increases allied difficulties in attempting to maintain a consistent picture of the enemy order of battle. On occasion, units, which were subordinate to a regular army division or regiment, have been reassigned or redesignated upon arrival. This variation in procedure is as confusing to the North Vietnamese soldier as it is to his captors. Replacement personnel often can only report the designation of their infiltration group or the unit that trained them in North Vietnam. If they are captured shortly after their arrival in the south, they sometimes appear unaware of the outfit to which they have been assigned. The distinction between regular and replacement personnel is not clear in their minds, making them poor sources of information on the time and effort Hanoi is currently expending on the training of replacement personnel.

#### Infiltration Training

22. Manpower studies indicate that North Vietnam has the capacity to train 145,000 to 175,000 men a year for infiltration.

By shortening current training cycles or increasing the number of units involved in the training of new recruits, this number could be substantially increased. In the past, basic training for North Vietnamese infantry personnel has averaged about three months, although increasing numbers of prisoners report only about one month's training prior to moving south. This level of training prepares them to serve as filler personnel in established units, but does not provide them with the group training required to participate in a newly formed company or battalion.

23. There is evidence of a growing deficiency of properly trained personnel to fill the ranks of squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders. There are indications that the normal source of platoon leaders--the Infantry Officers School near Son Tay--has reduced its two-year course to eight months. The bulk of the reserve officers and noncommissioned officers have been recalled to active duty. The largest single source of junior officers is now from battlefield commissions.

~~SECRET~~Question 5.

Can it be determined with more particularity as to what is the mission and function of the twelve base camps spotted in Cambodia on the map displayed by the  briefer?

25X1

We believe that the Vietnamese Communists utilize all of their bases on Cambodian territory for the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam, and that they take refuge in these bases whenever this becomes necessary. Additional functions have been associated with certain base areas, however, and some differences in the relative importance of functions at the various bases have been detected. Information on the base areas is spotty, being derived largely from PW reports, low-level agent observations, and recently, from reconnaissance team penetrations. Our intelligence on the mission and function of twelve Vietnamese Communist base areas located in whole or in part on Cambodian territory is summarized in the following pages. The base areas are discussed in north to south order, and their approximate locations are given in terms of the U.T.M. grid systems.

Base Area 609

Base Area 609\* is a major base for the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. In recent weeks a road connection from Laotian Route 96 has been extended through the base area, from which one branch extends eastward to link with Route 512 in South Vietnam. Another branch now under construction runs southward to South Vietnam and closely parallels the Cambodian border. Reconnaissance team penetrations of the area have revealed additional improvements, such as the expansion of storage facilities, the preparation of AW/AA positions, foxholes and trenches, and the laying of barbed wire. New parallel north-south trails also are being developed, some of which lie as much as fifteen miles west of the South Vietnam border. A headquarters element of the 1st NVA Division and elements of several other units of the B-3 Front have been located within or near the 609 Base Areas since November 1967.

Base Area 702

Base Area 702\*\* is a principal rest and resupply base for Vietnamese Communist troops infiltrating into South Vietnam. It

\* Base Area 609, as currently defined by MACV, includes the DAK BRANG Base, which at one time was listed separately. Base Area 609 has also been referred to as the Tri-border Base, because it encompasses portions of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam (approximately the area bounded by YB 6423; YB 7125; YB 5260; YB 6220.

\*\*Base Area 702 has also been called the Tonle San Base and the Se San Base.

~~SECRET~~

has also been used by combat units preparing for action as well as by units recovering from action. Base facilities include numerous prepared bivouac sites -- some of which contain well-made shelters -- at least two hospitals, underground bunkers for the storage of munitions, general storage shelters, practice ranges, defensive positions, and a well-developed trail system. The base area extends for about 18 miles in a north-south alignment, from YA 562562 to YA 640245. It lies almost wholly within Cambodia, generally within ten miles of the border. The base is well-positioned for the receipt of supplies from Cambodia. The Tonle San River is navigable by small craft to the south side of the base, and Cambodia's Route 19 lies less than 2 miles away, also to the south. Ferry service across the Tonle San is available at several points on the periphery of the base area.

Twelve or more native villages lie within the 702 Base Area. Most of them house Montagnard tribes. A number of reports indicate that the Vietnamese Communists exercise some degree of control over the tribes, and use them for labor. Some recruitment of Montagnards into irregular units has also been reported. At least five Cambodian military and/or border police outposts are located on Route 19 and on the Tonle San River, within a few miles of Base 702, but there have been no reports, as yet, of clashes with the Vietnamese forces.

#### Base Area 701

Base Area 701\* is used by the Vietnamese Communists for the infiltration of troops into South Vietnam, for the collection, storage and forwarding of supplies, for training, and for refuge. The 701 Base Area covers a 12 mile wide strip of Cambodia's eastern border region that extends 15 to 20 miles southward from Route 19 (from approximately YA 6822 to YV 8292). Vietnamese Communist presence is concentrated in the northern half of this strip, an area that encompasses about 20 villages, most of which are Montagnard settlements. Nearly all of the villages are controlled by the North Vietnamese Army, and some have been completely taken over for the housing of troops and the storage of supplies. Many of the Montagnards are employed as porters and some have been recruited into combat units. Supplies from Cambodia are trucked into the villages and are carried to VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam by porters, bicycles, and pack animals. VC/NVA units occasionally remain within the base area for extended periods while receiving replacements, supplies and training. Cambodian military and border police units located along Route 19 apparently do not obstruct the Vietnamese Communist activities.

\* Base Area 701 also has been called the Chu Pong Base and the Prek Drang Base.

SECRET

Undesignated Base in Mondolkiri Province

An undesignated base area, located at about YR 0535 in Cambodia's Mondolkiri Province, has been used for infiltrating men and supplies into South Vietnam and for a staging area for VC units moving against Allied positions in South Vietnam's Phuoc Long Province. Numerous trails cross the border, and a truck park and areas for the storage and transshipment of supplies have been tentatively identified. Supplies from Cambodia are delivered to the base over Route 14. Headquarters elements of the VC 5th LID moved into this area after attacking the U.S. Special Forces Camp at Bu Dop in early December and remained there until late December when they returned to South Vietnam. Elements of the 88th Regiment of the VC 5th LID were also in the area from about 10 December to 10 January, when they also returned to South Vietnam.

War Zone C - Four Undesignated Base Areas

War Zone C, encompassing the northern parts of Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces, has been used extensively by VC/NVA forces as operations bases. Communist activities have extended into Cambodia all along the roughly 100 mile section of border covered by War Zone C. Although MACV has not assigned specific base designations to portions of Cambodian territory that lie on the periphery of War Zone C, a heavy degree of VC/NVA activity has been observed in at least four areas. All of these areas apparently are used for the infiltration of men and supplies into Cambodia and for refuge. Some also include POW camps and/or hospitals.

An area of Cambodia on the northern edge of War Zone C, about 3 miles east of the point where Route 13 crosses the border into South Vietnam (XU 7235), has been heavily used by VC/NVA forces as a base of operations, for the hospitalization of sick and wounded, and for the infiltration of men and supplies across the border into South Vietnam. Several encampment areas have semi-permanent thatch-roofed shelters protected by systems of trenches and bunkers. Three hospitals are located there. There have been frequent changes of units using this base area; but from October 1967 to January 1968 the number of troops there apparently averaged between one and two thousand. Headquarters elements of the VC 9th Light Infantry Division, which attacked the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp in September and October 1967, were repeatedly detected in this base area from September 1967 until February 1968, when they moved into the area around Saigon.

Another area of concentrated Vietnamese Communist activity on the northern edge of War Zone C is that portion of Cambodia south of Mimot that is approximately centered on XT 4595. Although newsmen who accompanied Cambodian officials to this area in December 1967 found only a single vacant camp containing some rudimentary shelters,



~~SECRET~~

reliable sources indicate that from one to two thousand men -- mostly elements of COSVN -- were located within this area from October 1967 until January 1968. Some of the COSVN elements moved into South Vietnam in January to participate in the TET offensive, but the command element remained in Cambodia.

There have been additional concentrations of VC force activity on the southwestern edge of War Zone C within Cambodia's Svay Rieng Province. One of these is about 20 miles north of Route 1 on the Prek Ta Te River at about WT 9262. A 1,500 man unit is reported to have infiltrated into South Vietnam from this area in October 1967. VC facilities at this location include a hospital and supply caches. To the south, an area about 3 miles north of Route 1 at about XT 2524 has been used as a supply depot and also has contained a POW camp. The delivery of supplies to the base is facilitated by its proximity to Route 1. There are numerous bivouac sites in this area. During Operation Yellowstone (a U.S. sweep) in Tay Ninh Province in the period December 1967-February 1968, several small VC units moved into this area from South Vietnam.

#### Ba Thu Base

The Ba Thu village (XT 1218) area of Cambodia supports VC/NVA operations by providing facilities for training, the production, storage and distribution of weapons, the infiltration of weapons and equipment into South Vietnam, the treatment and evacuation of wounded, and for other ancillary activities such as the publication of propaganda. At least 35 of the village's buildings have been associated with VC/NVA activities. Some armaments, such as grenades, mines, and mortars, are manufactured in Communist workshops at Ba Thu. Several Communist soldiers captured during the recent TET offensive, reported that many recruits were trained and equipped with new AK-47 rifles at Ba Thu in the few weeks preceding TET. Fifty recruits at a time undertook 15 day training programs. Instruction covered military tactics and doctrine, medical treatment, reconnaissance, and the maintenance and use of the AK-47 and CKC rifles.

The detection of Vietnamese Communists in this area is particularly difficult. Ba Thu is an ethnic Vietnamese enclave into which the Vietnamese Communists readily merge. Furthermore, there are indications that Vietnamese Communists located in and around Ba Thu village are on good terms with a nearby Cambodian border outpost, and may have received advance notice of impending visits by the ICC.

#### Base Area 703

We have no current information on the nature of the facilities

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

at the 703 Base, which is located at about WT 1413, but it was occupied as recently as last November by two VC units totalling about 600 men.

#### Base Area 704

Base Area 704 supports the infiltration of men and supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam, a training center, a POW camp, a facility for medical treatment, and bivouac areas. Base 704 is located at approximately WT 1410. Its proximity to the Mekong River and other smaller waterways facilitates the infiltration of supplies. Shelters within the base area are temporary structures, consisting of crude frames draped with green nylon and camouflaged with branches, and in at least some bivouac areas, they are dismantled and moved every few days to reduce the risk of detection. The headquarters of VC MR II has been located in the 704 area. A PW has reported that in preparation for the TET offensive, at least one VC/NVA combat unit conducted field exercises within the base area in early January, and that a new camp was constructed to house prisoners.

#### Base Area 705

Base Area 705 (at about VS 7065) is used by the Vietnamese Communists for the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam, for the evacuation of wounded, for refuge, and for training. A recently captured VC supply officer stated that even though local Cambodian officials have been bribed to overlook the Vietnamese Communist presence in the 705 Base Area, the Vietnamese are required to comport themselves unobtrusively, and are not permitted to build permanent structures. Supplies, including some arms, are delivered to the area by Cambodians, and are smuggled into South Vietnam by the VC. Training programs identified with Base 705 include weapons familiarization, mine laying techniques, and assault tactics. Guides carry mail and escort troops between Base 705 and Base 704, which lies about 40 miles to the northeast.

SECRET

Question 6.

A report is desired as to the outcome of attack which have been made by US/SVN forces on enemy base areas in the Saigon area. For instance, now that the old COSVN area has been overrun, what was found there, particularly what increased intelligence was obtained which was of value for further military operations?

Question 7.

What intelligence efforts are now being made by US/South Vietnam elements to obtain information on the forward distribution system utilized by the enemy for the support of its military operations, as the basis for interdiction of such distribution by our military forces?

☐ does not produce reports analyzing US/SVN military operations. We have, however, queried MACV J-2 on the outcome of attacks against enemy base areas in the Saigon area. MACV J-2 informs us that they have found no enemy base areas in the Saigon area. They have, however, retaken areas which were occupied by the enemy. The intelligence taken from these operations was sparse -- some documents were found which enabled MACV to break enemy codes which were written into his messages and documents. The operations also discovered a few caches of weapons and other equipment.

25X1

MACV also reports that Operation Yellowstone (9 December 1967-24 February 1968) in Tay Ninh yielded several tons of documents that were useful in his analysis of the enemy's post-TET strategy and will be of help in future operational planning.

MACV further reports that operations such as Quyet Thang (Resolve to Win) have yet to produce any significant intelligence. MACV notes that friendly operation over the past year in the Saigon area have not uncovered sizeable enemy base areas of the type containing the large collections of valuable documents uncovered in the Cedar Falls and Junction City operations.

The principal intelligence effort to process information on the enemy's forward distribution as a basis for interdiction operations is carried out by the Targets Section of the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV).

This is the unit that produces the basic base areas studies for MACV, J-2. It also produces Base Area Study Update Maps on a periodic basis. These maps are prepared on an all-source basis and include all available intelligence on base facilities, LUC's, trails and waystations. These reports are made available to MACV, J-3 for operations planning.

25X1

Question 8.

What intelligence is available to the US as to the extent of destruction of enemy trucks as the result of US interdiction of logistic supply routes?

The basic source used to determine the number of enemy trucks destroyed or damaged by air attacks is post-strike operations reports (OPREP-4's). These reports include the targets attacked, the estimated results, ordnance expended, and other operational data. The number of trucks destroyed or damaged is compiled from this raw data by a process which attempts to eliminate duplication in reporting.

Pilots reports of truck destruction in Laos are cross-checked with reports from the forward air controllers (FAC's) and the results plotted on maps according to the time of attack. For operations in North Vietnam, the data are recorded by location and time in order to eliminate duplicate reports, but the cross-check with FAC reports is limited because FAC's are used only in Route Package 1.

The criteria used by pilots in their reporting are significant in determining the number of trucks destroyed or damaged. (1) The pilots normally report a truck as destroyed when it is seen to explode or burn. (2) A truck is reported damaged when there is an obvious weapons impact without conclusive evidence of destruction. (3) If strikes produce large secondary explosions or fires in an area under tree cover where trucks are seen to have disappeared, the trucks are reported as probably destroyed or damaged. In the first two cases the numbers of trucks are accepted as reported, but in the latter case the "probable" number is not included in the compilation of total trucks destroyed and damaged.

After the total number reported destroyed and damaged in North Vietnam and Laos is determined, the "effective losses" are calculated to take into consideration the fact that trucks reported damaged could be repaired and that because of operational conditions pilot reports may be overstated. Effective losses are derived, therefore, by estimating that 75 percent of the trucks reported destroyed and 25 percent of those reported damaged were in fact lost and were not repairable. This number is deducted from the North Vietnamese truck inventory. In addition six percent of the estimated inventory at the beginning of the year is deducted for retirements of trucks due to normal wear and tear.

Substantial imports of trucks have been received by North Vietnam beginning in 1965 from other Communists countries. These

**SECRET**

25X1

trucks arrive in North Vietnam by overland and sea routes. Import data are firm except for imports from Communist China, and are carefully compiled from all sources of intelligence.

The following tabulation shows the inventory of trucks available to North Vietnam at the end of 1966 and 1967, and the impact of effective losses of trucks and the importation of trucks during 1967.

End of 1966 Inventory	<u>12,598</u> a/
Retirement (6 percent)	- 755
Imports during 1967 a/	+4,686
Effective Losses	
North Vietnam	-2,683
Laos	-2,072
End of 1967	<u>11,942</u>
Rounded to	<u>11,000 - 13,000</u>

a/ Including an estimated 1,200 trucks from China.

SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

C  
O  
P  
Y

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1968


Pat:

I would like to get a combined [ ] briefing on enemy order of battle in South Viet-Nam which will bring out any differences of opinion which exist on this subject in the intelligence community. I would like the briefing to include a discussion of military manpower capabilities of North Viet-Nam. Specifically, what is the basis for the statement on Page A-7, paragraph 25, The Situation in Viet-Nam? "Manpower studies indicate that North Viet-Nam has the capacity to train 75,000 to 100,000 men a year for infiltration."

25X1

M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-TRINE

March 23, 1968

Pat:

I would like to get a combined [redacted] briefing on enemy order of battle in South Viet-Nam which will bring out any differences of opinion which exist on this subject in the intelligence community. I would like the briefing to include a discussion of military manpower capabilities of North Viet-Nam. Specifically, what is the basis for the statement on Page A-7, paragraph 25, The Situation in Viet-Nam? "Manpower studies indicate that North Viet-Nam has the capacity to train 75,000 to 100,000 men a year for infiltration."

M02  
M. D. T.

Dated 3/22/68  
(20)

Hand passed to:  
1/ Custy, DIA  
2/ Bross, CIA

TOP SECRET-TRINE

SC 05496-68/1  
ER 4/



TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD


March 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Bross  
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: North Vietnam Logistic Activities

Attached hereto is a list of questions raised and requests for additional information made by General Maxwell D. Taylor, when he was briefed on aspects of the above subject by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency representatives on February 26, 1968. The list contains two questions (Nos. 9 and 10) which were added by General Taylor subsequent to the briefing.

It would be appreciated if you would please have the desired information written up and forwarded to this office for delivery to General Taylor.

  
for J. Patrick Coyne

Attachment

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

1. What assurance is available that CIA and DIA are pressing intelligence collectors sufficiently to obtain necessary information on the Viet Cong/North Vietnam logistic system? Is it not feasible for [ ] and DIA to sit down with MACV and work out the intelligence collection program required to meet this intelligence need, or is this already being done?

2. What are the estimated figures on the interdicted capacity of the various transport systems over which supplies are introduced into North Vietnam and over which they subsequently move south (in contrast to the theoretical un-interdicted capacities). Also what are the figures on the amounts and kinds of supplies which actually pass over the roads over which distribution is made by North Vietnam to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces (in contrast to the theoretical capacity of the road nets).

3. Is it not possible at this time to obtain better figures on the size and mission of the various enemy Transportation Groups spotted on the chart used in the briefing by a CIA representative?

4. Has not someone studied available intelligence on the movement of North Vietnamese forces, as the basis for an understanding of what takes place when a division moves south (e.g., how is it transported? does it move at night? etc.)

5. Can it not be determined with more particularity as to what is the mission and function of one of the 12 base camps spotted in Cambodia on the map displayed by a CIA briefer? -- Training mission? Supply? Hospital?

6. A report is desired as to the outcome of attacks which have been made by U.S./SVN forces on enemy base areas in the Saigon area. For instance, now that the old COSVN area has been over-run what was found there, particularly what increased intelligence was obtained which was of value for further military operations?

7. What intelligence efforts are now being made by U.S./South Vietnam elements to obtain information on the forward distribution system utilized by the enemy for the support of its military operations, as the basis for interdiction of such distribution by our military forces?

8. What intelligence is available to the U. S. as to the extent of destruction of enemy trucks as the result of U. S. interdiction of logistic supply routes?

9. What do we know about the enemy's replacement system? How, when and for how long are replaced trained? How moved South? How incorporated into units?

10. What is the status of the project to provide more COMINT-equipped aircraft to monitor traffic in North Vietnam?

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

TOP SECRET

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. R. J. Smith, DD/I		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b>  <p>Confirming the discussion at the staff meeting this morning, would you be kind enough to take whatever action is appropriate in connection with the annexed request from Mr. J. Patrick Coyne.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">JABROSS</p>			
<b>FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER</b>			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
John A. Bross, D/DCI/NIPE			3-12-68
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	

FORM NO. 1-67 **237**

Use previous editions

(40)

**Page Denied**

Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied